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When Lone Wolf Defectors 
Undermine the power of the opt-
out Default
eamonn ferguson1 ✉, Ruslan Shichman2 & Jonathan H. W. tan3
High levels of cooperation are a central feature of human society, and conditional cooperation has 
been proposed as one proximal mechanism to support this. the counterforce of free-riding can, 
however, undermine cooperation and as such a number of external mechanisms have been proposed to 
ameliorate the effects of free-riding. One such mechanism is setting cooperation as the default (i.e., an 
opt-out default). We posit, however, that in dynamic settings where people can observe and condition 
their actions on others’ behaviour, ‘lone wolf’ defectors undermine initial cooperation encouraged 
by an opt-out default, while ‘good shepherds’ defeat the free-riding encouraged by an opt-in default. 
Thus, we examine the dynamic emergence of conditional cooperation under different default 
settings. Specifically, we develop a game theoretical model to analyse cooperation under defaults for 
cooperation (opt-out) and defection (opt-in). The model predicts that the ‘lone wolf’ effect is stronger 
than the ‘good shepherd’ effect, which – if anticipated by players – should strategically deter free-riding 
under opt-out and cooperation under opt-in. Our experimental games confirm the existence of both 
‘lone wolf’ defectors and ‘good shepherd’ cooperators, and that the ‘lone wolf’effect is stronger in the 
context of organ donation registration behaviour. We thus show a potential ‘dark side’ to conditional 
cooperation (‘lone wolf effect’) and draw implications for the adoption of an opt-out organ donation 
policy.
The high levels of cooperation observed across all human societies1–4 are hard to explain from the perspective 
of natural selection: why would someone perform a behaviour that benefits another at a personal cost3,4? To 
address this problem a number of ultimate (‘why’) explanations (e.g., kin selection), supported by a number 
of proximal (‘how’) mechanisms, have been proposed2–7. This paper focuses on one of these proximal mecha-
nisms: conditional cooperation6. Conditional cooperators are individuals who vary their levels of cooperation 
(e.g., contributing to the public good) proportionally to the contributions of others6,8. However, while the num-
ber of conditional cooperators is high (62%), their contribution is proportionally less than one-to-one with the 
group average and this combined with more free-riders (18.7%) than rare unconditional cooperators results in 
average contributions decaying over time8–10. As such, other mechanisms are required to ameliorate this decay 
and sustain cooperation1. For example, setting defaults supporting wider societal cooperation11 which have been 
successful for organ donation5, childhood and adult vaccinations12,13, and environmental conservation14 is one 
option. To date, the majority of work on the power of defaults has examined this in static games where choices are 
made simultaneously15,16. Rarely has it been studied in dynamic games17 which model real world settings where 
others’ choices can be observed and strategically responded to. We contribute to this literature by examining 
how the cooperative context (opt-in or opt-out defaults for organ donation) shapes the dynamic expression of 
conditional cooperation. We show that initial cooperation, encouraged by an opt-out default, is undermined by 
the free-rider (‘lone wolf ’) who leads with unilateral defection (we call this the ‘lone wolf ’ effect). We show how 
initial free-riding, supported by an opt-in default, is defeated by the unconditional cooperator (‘good shepherd’) 
who leads with unilateral cooperation (we call this the ‘good shepherd’ effect). We also show that the ‘lone wolf ’ 
effect is stronger than the ‘good shepherd’ effect.
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cooperative defaults and the dynamics of conditional cooperation
When faced with alternative choices, the default is the option selected by the person if they do not actively take 
action18. Within the context of cooperation, the use of opt-out defaults has been a powerful mechanism to 
increase cooperation in contexts characterized by free-riding5,11–14,19, for example in organ donation, an applica-
tion which motivated the games studied in this paper5,19. Under an opt-out policy for organ donation, the default 
is that everyone is presumed to be a donor unless they actively opt-out. Conversely, the opt-in policy for organ 
donation supports free-riding, with the default for everyone to be a non-donor unless they actively opt-in and 
register with about 38% of the UK and 60% of the USA population registering under opt-in. However, moving 
to an opt-out, from an opt-in, policy increases cooperation in terms of the number of registered donors and the 
number of potential organs for transplantation5,19,20.
Defaults are effective policy tools because choosing the default: (1) requires reduced effort (e.g. reduced cogni-
tive load in the face of complexity), (2) biases the decision maker’s behaviour towards the status quo response, and 
(3) frames the perceived meaning of the behaviour11,18,21. Applied to organ donation, the opt-out default makes 
registration easy with everyone registered and thus preserves the status quo. Furthermore, the meaning of organ 
donation under opt-out is that of a mundane and everyday act of cooperation (equivalent to letting someone 
ahead of you in a queue)21. Similarly for opt-in, remaining unregistered is the easy option with the status quo 
being that the majority remain unregistered, which leads to a context supporting free-riding. Furthermore, regis-
tering to donate an organ (cooperating) is perceived as an extreme cooperative act (similar to giving away 50% on 
one’s wealth to charity after death) under opt-in21 with the opt-in context characterised by reduced trust that oth-
ers will cooperate22. We provide evidence from a survey experiment conducted over two waves (Supplementary 
File S1) confirming the differential status quo perceptions for opt-out and opt-in, with participants perceiving 
more people as remaining registered under opt-out (73.1% wave 1 & 72.6% wave 2) compared to registering under 
opt-in (29.8% wave 1 & 32.8% wave 2). People are also more trusting that others will remain registered under opt-out 
than register under opt-in. Thus, the opt-out default is seen as having a large number of people trusted to remain 
as donor, and the opt-in default as one with a few people trusted to register.
Given the very different meanings of the opt-out and opt-in defaults, how will this influence the emergence 
of conditional cooperation to  affect overall levels of cooperation and free-riding? The effect of the default on the 
emergence of conditional cooperation will critically depend on whether or not the behaviour is observable6,7.
observability and feedback. Cooperation is more likely to emerge if people can observe others coop-
erate and respond contingently7. With limited information about others’ cooperative choices we would expect 
the influence of conditional cooperation to be small and for an opt-out default to encourage cooperation and 
the opt-in default to encourage defection23. For example, in the context of organ donation, health authorities 
provide generic information only in terms of the number of donors or organs needed and thus people are not 
able to respond contingently to others’ registration decisions. Consistent with this lack of opportunity to respond 
contingently, an opt-out advantage of organ donation has been observed in terms of increased numbers of trans-
plants5,19,20. However, if people can observe others’ decisions to register or de-register immediately, they can 
change their behaviour contingent on others actions. With such individualistic feedback, we would expect to 
observe strong effects of conditional cooperation. Indeed, the use of social media, allowing people to share their 
organ donor status and positive or negative stories about organ donation in real time means that the potential for 
such individualistic feedback is a reality these days24–29. A recent Facebook campaign exemplifies effects of indi-
vidualistic feedback on organ donor registrations25. Set within an opt-in system this campaign allowed individu-
als to post status updates about their organ donor registration, resulting in increased registrations25. This so called 
‘Facebook’ effect indicates how with an opt-in system and individualistic feedback, conditional cooperation can 
result in increased cooperation (our ‘good shepherd’ effect). We develop this by experimentally testing the effects 
of individualistic feedback. In particular, our experiment contrasts static games where feedback is provided only 
across games (no individualistic feedback) to dynamic games where subjects can also respond contingently to the 
feedback of others’ actions within a game before payoffs accrue. We further explore how such feedback varies as 
a function of default setting (opt-in vs opt-out).
opt-out vs opt-in and the role of lone wolves and good shepherds. What happens to levels of 
cooperation or defection when people can observe others’ decisions, when these are framed within either cooper-
ation (opt-out) or free-riding (opt-in) defaults?
Being registered to donate organs under either an opt-in or opt-out system involves psychological costs30,31. 
These costs stem from considering one’s morality, perceived violations of bodily integrity, medical mistrust at 
how one may be treated by the medical profession in life-threatening situations (e.g., harvesting organs before 
death), the ‘ick’ factor (i.e., donating organs feels disgusting), the ‘jinx’ factor (i.e., registering makes one more 
likely to die) and a preference for individual over state ownership. However, while it is individually costly to be a 
registered donor, the person also benefits more with increased numbers of others registered, as more organs will 
be available in times of need. Maintaining the status quo of an opt-out default yields a Pareto efficient state with a 
higher organ supply, while the status quo of an opt-in default, with a lower organ supply, is socially inefficient. As 
people opt-out (opt-in), the supply of organ and related benefits decrease (increase), resulting in Pareto inferior 
(superior) states compared to the status quo. Thus, organ donation and public goods games have similar payoff 
structures ex ante32.
The psychological cost of organ donation implies that it pays off (and is therefore incentive compatible) 
to deregister, under an opt-out system, when others are observed to deregister. Consistently, the behavioural 
rule of conditional cooperation also predicts that people will deregister when others do (negative conditional 
cooperation). We term this the ‘lone wolf effect’ as others deregister contingent on the actions of a deregistering 
‘lone wolf ’. Conditional cooperation similarly predicts that people will register if others do (positive conditional 
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cooperation)6. As discussed above, donating one’s organs is perceived as an extreme act of cooperation under an 
opt-in system21 and thus will signal the person’s virtue as a ‘good shepherd’ that others could follow and likewise 
cooperate and register33. The ‘good shepherd’ effect is compatible with the positive ‘Facebook’ effect discussed 
above. However, it pays off to not follow when others are observed to register to avoid incurring psychological 
costs. Thus, the ‘lone wolf ’ will have a stronger negative impact on cooperation than the positive impact of a ‘good 
shepherd’. Also, there are more free-riders than unconditional cooperators to trigger off the ‘lone wolf ’ effect8,34.
These decisions can be analysed with a simple game as follows, which forms the basis of our study. A full game 
theoretic analysis and proofs are found in Supplementary File S2. Consider players who have to choose whether 
or not to change their registration status from being unregistered under opt-in or registered under an opt-out. 
Registration decreases payoffs, as it incurs psychological costs. One’s expected payoff increases when co-players 
register, as it increases the chance of transplant and survival after organ failure. In static games, defaults do not 
change the dominant strategy of free riding. In dynamic games with an opt-in policy, not following a ‘good shep-
herd’ who has opted in dominates the strategy of following to opt-in, because being registered is psychologi-
cally costly. There is no incentive to be a ‘good shepherd’ and the equilibrium is to stay (mutually) unregistered. 
Conversely, in dynamic games with an opt-out policy, following a ‘lone wolf ’ who had opted-out dominates 
the psychologically costly strategy of staying registered. This ultimately results in mutual deregistering, which 
decreases expected payoffs. However, anticipating a worse eventual outcome from opting out, by backward induc-
tion one is better off sticking to the default (in equilibrium). Moreover, one need not worry about being free rid-
den on if defection by others can be observed and responded to before payoffs accrue; one can therefore wait to 
see if that really happens instead of defecting on the belief that others will defect too. This establishes the strategic 
power of the default embodied in opt-out, which is absent in static games. However, if others deviate off equilib-
rium, in particular free-riders opt-out and unconditional cooperators in opt-in, it pays to follow a ‘lone-wolf ’ but 
not a ‘good shepherd’. We show that contrary to equilibrium predictions under self-interest, the ‘good shepherd’ 
increases cooperation by leading conditional cooperators thereby defeating free riding, and cooperative behav-
iour as signalled by an opt-out default policy is undermined over time when conditional cooperators can observe 
and follow ‘lone-wolf ’ defection.
Cooperative and defection spill-over effects. Cooperative defaults can be changed in practice. For 
organ donation most countries have started to move to an opt-out policy having previously had an opt-in policy19. 
What is the effect of this change? Evidence shows that exposure to a cooperative context enhances subsequent 
generosity (a ‘cooperative spill-over’ effect)35. Conversely, exposure to a non-cooperation context leads to a ‘defec-
tion’ mind-set and increases subsequent free-riding (a ‘defection spill-over’ effect)36. We examine such spill-over 
effects by exploring how the experience of a change in default (from opt-in to opt-out and visa-versa) influences 
the dynamics of cooperation. The opt-in default should lead to a defection mind-set that spills over and, via a 
strong ‘lone-wolf ’ effect, reduces the potential benefits of the opt-out policy. Therefore, we hypothesise that a 
move from opt-in to opt-out will result in reduced registration rates in the presence of individualised feedback.
Method
Sample. Two hundred and thirteen participants took part in the economic game experiment (M age = 21.76; 
SD = 2.84; 62% female; 27% on the organ donor register and 83% believed that the game represented organ donor 
registrations). They were recruited via the University of Nottingham CeDEx subject pool.
procedure and design. Participants played one game in each round. There were 22 rounds in each exper-
imental session. In each round, participants made registration choices. We use the term period to refer to each 
time point within a round. A schematic of the procedure and design is presented in Fig. 1, which shows that all 
registration choices were made in the choice phase which precede the earnings phase where individuals then real-
ize their health outcomes on organ failure, transplantations or death.
Our experiment extends the basic static opt-in game of Kessler and Roth32, see also37 (see Supplementary File 
S3 for full verbatim instructions and screen shots of the game). As with the original studies32, we use induced 
value to model incentives relevant to organ donation. Extending the study by  Kessler and Roth32 we test an 
opt-out static game, as well as introduce dynamic opt-in and opt-out games. These dynamic games differ by 
providing individualistic feedback that allows players to update and change their choices contingent on oth-
ers’ actions in multi-period choice tasks within a game. This models conditional cooperation in organ donation 
choices in reality. Our experiment also differs in that we explore dynamic changes in default setting (participants 
play a block of 11 opt-in games and move to play a block of 11 opt-out or vice versa). Finally, we let participants 
find out their health outcomes (i.e., whether or not they actually donate or need and receive an organ), ergo exper-
imental earnings, only at the end of the experiment. Thus, we temporally ensure that all registration decisions 
precede health outcomes as would happen in reality. In Kessler and Roth’s experiment32, participants can choose 
to register or not and then they find out if they need organs or have died and can donate before making their 
next registration decision. Thus, those who have experienced life or death as a donor or recipient in a previous 
round make living decisions anew. Their learning patterns and behaviour are, therefore, potentially influenced by 
their experiences of health outcomes as donor or recipient, which do not feature in reality. To avoid this, we have 
participants make and receive per-round feedback on registration choices for all their choice tasks, after which 
they find out their health outcomes in corresponding earnings stages from four rounds randomly selected by the 
computer to determine their payments (see Fig. 1).
Participants made registration choices in 22 rounds of choice tasks in groups of three with fixed and anon-
ymous membership. Before making choices, participants were told that they would start each round with one 
active A unit two active B units, which models a good state of health with functioning brain and kidneys, respec-
tively, and an initial endowment of 2 points. Each point was worth 0.75p (UK). The task was to choose their donor 
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status, which was whether or not to register or remain as a donor. Being registered or remaining registered as a 
donor cost 0.4 points.
A 2 (default change: opt-in to opt-out or opt-out to opt-in) by 2 (order of default change: opt-in to opt-out vs 
opt-out to opt-in) by 2 (feedback: with or without individualistic feedback) mixed design was used. Default change 
was a within-subject factor and order of default change and individualistic feedback a between-subject factors. 
Twelve lab-based sessions were organized into 6 sessions (3 with individualistic feedback and 3 without) starting 
with opt-out (11 rounds in block 1) and changing to opt-in (11 rounds block 2) and 6 sessions (3 with individu-
alistic feedback and 3 without) starting with opt-in (11 rounds in block 1) and changing to opt-out (11 rounds in 
block 2). Participants were not informed how many rounds to expect but were instructed on the new rules of the 
game when moving from one default to another. Randomization was at the session level and within session for 
with and without feedback. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree38. Participants were incentive compatibly 
paid according to the protocol described.
While our game’s incentives are similar to voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiments, in that 
individually costly contributions improve expected social welfare, there are three main differences in that our 
game: (1) has non-deterministic payoffs that depend on probabilistic events in one’s simulated life-cycle in the 
earnings stage; (2) has feedback within games, which implies a novel dynamic move structure, and (3) is framed 
within specific defaults. However, we would still expect to see some key features of (1) static VCM experiments 
where defaults and frames influence cooperation15,16, (2) repeated VCM experiments by observing a decay in 
contributions over rounds9,10, and (3) dynamic VCM experiments where feedback within games yield conditional 
cooperation or conflict17,39.
Manipulation of defaults frame. Under opt-in participants were told that ‘At the start of each round, 
everyone in the group is automatically a non-donor.’ In contrast, under the opt-out participants were told that ‘At 
the start of each round, everyone in the group is automatically a donor.’ Thus, we frame defaults in a similar way 
to others in this field of research21,37.
Manipulation of feedback. Following Tan et al.17 individualistic feedback on others’ cooperation was pro-
vided to allow others to conditionally respond. The screen showed the current number of other members of their 
group who were registered as donors. This initially stated that all three were donors under opt-out, and all three 
were non-donors under opt-in. This was updated per-period as and when someone in the group had changed 
their status. Based on that individualistic feedback, participants could change their status from the default as a 
donor under opt-out and non-donor under-opt-in. We prevented strategic cheap talk or non-committal actions 
by disallowing participants to revert after changing status (i.e., each player could change their status once), thus 
allowing for direct interpretation of the data without confounds from such motives, and to ensure timely progress 
in the experiment. This design feature was also motivated by the evidence that people very rarely change their 
organ donor registrations decisions. For example, 6 months before Wales in the UK moved to opt-out, 1% of those 
registered under opt-in stated they would deregister under opt-out40.
Participants could change their status as long as someone had changed their status in the previous period 
within that round. The choice task for each round lasts at least one period (if no player changes or all players 
change in the first period) and at most three periods (if one player changes in each period). As there were three 
players in each group one could change their status in the first period if two others had changed in period 1, in the 
second period if one other had changed in the preceding period, or in the third period if one other had changed 
in each of the two preceding periods. Only final decisions factored into the earnings stage.
Figure 1. Schematic of the experimental games and design features.
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In games without individualistic feedback, participants only knew others’ choices at the end of each round 
when choices were fixed and payoffs had accrued. Therefore, this required only one period and did not allow for 
within round conditional cooperation.
Lifecycle earnings. The earnings phase followed after completion of all 22 rounds of choice tasks in the 
choice phase (see Fig. 1). In each earnings stage, a participant started with one active A unit (akin to a brain or 
heart), two active B units (akin to kidneys). Each earnings stage proceeded in periods, and registration decisions 
corresponded with the choices made in the respective rounds of the choice phase. In each period, there is a 10% 
chance that their A unit would fail, and a 15% chance that their B units would fail (both B units fail at the same 
time). If their A unit and B units are active in a period, they earn 1 point and the round continues to the next 
period. If their A unit fails, they lose 1 point and the round ends in that period. If their A unit is still active but 
B units fail, they can continue for up to 5 periods without active B units while waiting for a donor B unit. Before 
receiving a donor B unit, a participant will earn 0 points per period. They can receive a donor B unit from a 
co-participant who is a donor whose A unit has failed but B units have not failed before. If in one of these periods 
a participant receives a B unit from someone else, he or she will start earning points again. If one does not receive 
a B unit within those five periods, he/she loses 1 point and their round ends in the last of those five periods. On 
average participants earned £12.77 (= US$16.73) for around an hour’s worth of work.
outcome. Our main outcome variable was individual registration choice where 1 = registered, 0 = not regis-
tered, i.e. those actively opted in or those not actively opted out. Participants made decisions by pressing a button 
to maintain with the default (registered under opt-out or non-registered under opt-in) or one to change away 
from the default (de-register under opt-out and register under opt-in). Thus, they were making active choices 
about whether to be a donor or not.
covariates. For robustness, we assessed a number of covariates that may influence organ donor registration 
decisions. We asked participants at the end of the game to indicate ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to whether they were currently 
registered as an organ donor and to indicate if they felt that the game represented (1) organ donation, (2) blood 
donation, (3) donating money to charity, (4) giving up time to volunteer for a charity (coded 1 = organ donation 
and 0 = others). We asked about current and past blood donor status, and other volunteering behaviour. To avoid 
over-fitting our models we only held being on the organ donor register as a covariate as it is highly correlated with 
blood donor and volunteering status41. Participants completed the attitudes toward organ donation question-
naire30. This was not analysed due to low reliability of some of the sub-scales (e.g., α = 0.45 & 0.55).
ethics statement. All three experiments were approved and registered by the ethical procedures of the 
School of Psychology Ethic committee at the University of Nottingham (Experiments 1 reference 543, Experiment 
2 reference 550, Experiment 3 reference 410) and were conducted in accordance with the relevant guidelines and 
regulations of the British Psychological Society (https://www.bps.org.uk/sites/bps.org.uk/files/Policy/Policy%20
-%20Files/BPS%20Code%20of%20Ethics%20and%20Conduct%20%28Updated%20July%202018%29.pdf) and 
the University of Nottingham (https://workspace.nottingham.ac.uk/display/ResEth/Code+of+Research+Co
nduct+and+Research+Ethics?preview = /123507321/298524330/Code%20of%20Research%20Conduct%20
and%20Research%20Ethics%20(Version%206a)%20(revisions%20Mar%202019).docx). Participants in all three 
experiments providing signed informed consent with their anonymity assured. Experiment 3 was pre-registered 
(OSF: see https://osf.io/g6mct/).
Results
Figure 2 details the dynamic time trends for registration decisions under changes from opt-in and opt-out and 
visa-versa, with or without individualistic feedback and Fig. 3 shows these as means (see Supplementary File 
S4 Table S1 for more details). Descriptively, it can be seen that the move from opt-in to opt-out results in a 
steep decline in registration rates, especially with individualistic feedback. Conversely, moving from opt-out to 
opt-in with individualistic feedback results in an initial uplift in registration rates. This may reflect a psychological 
contrast effect whereby people have become accustomed to observing others defecting by deregistering under 
Figure 2. Effects of Policy Change as a Function of Feedback for the 22 Rounds.
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opt-out, but suddenly observing others cooperate may be morally elevating and inspire cooperation33. This effect 
is worthy of future exploration.
Spill-over effects. Before examining our main hypotheses regarding conditional cooperation and the ‘lone 
wolf ’ and ‘good shepherd’ effects, there is evidence for a number of spill-over effects that are noteworthy. As pre-
dicted moving from opt-in to opt-out, with individualistic feedback, results in overall lower registrations under 
opt-out (Bar E in Fig. 2) than in opt-in (Bar F in Fig. 2). Regression analysis confirms this decrease in registra-
tion rates from opt-in to opt-out with individualistic feedback is significant (Supplementary File S4 Table S2: 
B = −0.124, SE = 0.062, p = 0.043, 95%CI = −0.245,–0.004 without covariates and B = −0.131, SE = 0.067, 
p = 0.050, 95%CI = −0.263, −0.000 with covariates). We explore below the ‘lone wolf ’ effect as an explanation 
for this decrease. Also, the move from opt-out to opt-in without individualistic feedback results in a significant 
reduction in registration rates (moving from Bar C to Bar D: B = −0.103, SE = 0.045; p = 0.024, 95%CI = −0.192, 
−0.014: without covariates and B = −0.178, SE = 0.061; p = 0.004, 95%CI = −0.298, −0.058 with covariates). This 
reflects the reverse of the standard opt-out advantage and may be referred to as an opt-in disadvantage that is 
observed specifically when individualistic feedback is not possible.
Main analytical strategy. To account for the non-independence of repeated group interactions, we analyse 
group means as the main dependent variable, using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with group level clustered 
random errors. All models include Round (round 1–22) and default (Opt-In: 1 = opt-in 0 = opt-out), and control 
for within group age, sex, belief that the game is about organ donation (Believe it is a game about organ donation 
= 1, all other beliefs =0) and if currently registered as a donor (1 = register, 0 = not). The main results for con-
ditional cooperation reported below hold when the same analyses are conducted without covariates42 (Tables S3, 
S4 and S5 in Supplementary File S4) and with individual decisions instead of group level means as the unit of 
analysis both with and without covariates (see Table S6 to S11 in Supplementary File S4).
Replicating the ‘opt-out advantage’ and ‘facebook’ effects. Model 1 (Table 1) explores the over-
all effect of the presence of individualistic feedback and its interaction with default (Feedback * Opt-In). The 
significant negative effect for round shows a decay in cooperation over time, consistent with VCM experi-
ments. Furthermore, the negative effect of the Opt-In replicates general finding that overall registration rates are 
higher under opt-out compared to opt-in, potentially leading to more transplantations, i.e. the overall ‘Opt-Out 
Advantage’5,19,20. The positive and significant interaction of feedback by default (Feedback * Opt-In) indicates 
that the effect of individualistic feedback is stronger under opt-in than opt-out overall, replicating the ‘Facebook’ 
effect25. This could result in more cooperation (registrations) in opt-in than opt-out under individualistic feed-
back overall, which shall be corroborated by Model 5.
Conditional cooperation (‘lone wolf’ effect) across rounds. To model the effects of conditional coop-
eration across rounds Model 2 (Table 1) adds the lagged effect of other’s decision in the previous round (Lag 
Round Decisions). Consistent with previous research on conditional cooperation we observe a positive effect6,8–10 
showing that overall people respond conditionally to cooperation overall decisions in the previous round by 
increasing their cooperation.
Lone-wolf effect across rounds. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 further explore the effect of across round 
conditional cooperation by examining it as a function of default (Lag Round Decisions * Opt-In) either without 
individualistic feedback (Model 3) or with individualistic feedback (Model 4). The positive and significant condi-
tional cooperation effect of decisions in previous rounds is found in both models. In Model 3 (without individu-
alistic feedback) the significant and negative interaction effect indicates that when individualistic feedback is not 
present, (negative) conditional cooperation is stronger under opt-out. That is, without individualistic feedback, 
observing previous round cooperation leads to more conditional cooperation in the present round under opt-out. 
Model 4 shows no difference between opt-in and opt-out in terms of across round conditional cooperation when 
Figure 3. Mean Registration Rate by Condition. Bars A to D refer to the conditions when participants moved 
from opt-out to opt-in and the bars E to H for participants who moved from an opt-in to opt-out. The results 
are further split by feedback type. Means and Standard Errors (se) for this figure can be found in Supplementary 
File S4 Table S1. Table S2 in Supplementary File S4 details regression models designed to assess spill-over effects 
in this table. Error bars are 95% CIs.
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individualistic feedback is present, which is possibly diminished by the more prominent role that within round 
conditional cooperation plays, as we test next.
Lone-wolf effect within round. We hypothesized that a stronger ‘lone-wolf ’ effect would be observed 
when people could update their behaviour based on feedback of others’ behaviour before each round ends and 
payoffs accrue. Model 5 (Table 3) tests this by examining how observations of decisions in previous periods 
within rounds (Lag Period Decisions) influences present period decisions and how this is moderated by the default 







Lower Upper Lower Upper
Model 1 Model 2
Round −0.004 (0.002) 0.043 −0.008 −0.000 −0.002 (0.001) 0.203 −0.004 0.001
Feedback −0.072 (0.064) 0.256 −0.197 0.053 −0.043 (0.038) 0.252 −0.117 0.031
Opt-In −0.051 (0.023) 0.023 −0.096 −0.007 −0.020 (0.013) 0.137 −0.046 0.006
Lag Round Decisions 0.427 (0.060) 0.000 0.310 0.544
Feedback* Opt-In 0.141 (0.039) 0.000 0.065 0.217 0.083 (0.026) 0.001 0.032 0.135
Age 0.000(0.025) 0.984 −0.048 0.049 0.005 (0.015) 0.732 −0.024 0.034
Sex 0.142 (0.127) 0.262 −0.107 0.391 0.113 (0.077) 0.141 −0.038 0.265
Game Beliefs 0.103 (0.139) 0.462 −0.171 0.376 0.053 (0.090) 0.551 −0.123 0.229
Organ Donor Register 0.035(0.126) 0.782 −0.212 0.282 0.020 (0.088) 0.824 −0.153 0.192
Constant 0.396 (0.542) 0.465 −0.667 1.458 0.098 (0.341) 0.774 −0.571 0.767
R2 overall 0.033 0.214
N of Observations 
(Groups) 3,102 (71) 2,961 (71)
Table 1. Overall (Model 1) and Conditional Cooperation (Model 2) Effects (Random Effects GLS Models with 
group level clustered random error) on group averages of decisions to register plus Covariates. The dependent 
variable is the group average of the Decision to Register (for each individual, 1 = on the register: actively 
registered under opt-in and not opted-out under opt-out, or 0 = not on the register: not having registered under 
opt-in and opted-out under opt-out). We have the following independent variables. Round is the game number 
1–22. Feedback: 0 = without individualistic feedback and 1 = with individualistic feedback, Opt-In: 0 = Opt-
out and = 1 = Opt-in. Lag Round Decisions = percent of group registered in the previous round. Sex: Female 
= 0, Male = 1. Game Beliefs: Not believe it is a game about organ donation = 0, Believe it is a game about organ 
donation = 1, Organ Donor Register: 0 if report not currently registered and 1 if currently registered.
Decision to Register






Lower Upper Lower Upper
Model 3 Model 4
Round −0.001 (0.001) 0.346 −0.003 0.001 −0.002 (0.002) 0.296 −0.006 0.002
Opt-In 0.052 (0.024) 0.030 0.005 0.100 0.014 (0.040) 0.716 −0.063 0.092
Lag Round Decisions 0.695 (0.060) 0.000 0.577 0.813 0.318 (0.087) 0.000 0.147 0.488
Lag Round Decisions* 
Opt-In −0.129 (0.050) 0.010 −0.228 −0.031 0.111 (0.086) 0.196 −0.057 0.278
Age 0.000 (0.015) 0.991 −0.029 0.028 0.012 (0.022) 0.585 −0.030 0.054
Sex −0.001 (0.087) 0.989 −0.171 0.169 0.152 (0.105) 0.148 −0.054 0.358
Game Beliefs 0.036 (0.067) 0.595 −0.096 0.167 0.045 (0.131) 0.732 −0.211 0.301
Organ Donor Register 0.048 (0.060) 0.422 −0.069 0.165 0.001 (0.133) 0.995 −0.260 0.262
Constant 0.115 (0.327) 0.724 −0.525 0.755 −0.041 (0.472) 0.931 −0.967 0.885
R2 overall 0.403 0.186
N of Observations(Groups) 756 (36) 2,205 (35)
Table 2. Across Round Conditional Cooperation Effects as a function of Default and Feedback (Random 
Effects GLS Models with group level clustered random error) on group averages of decisions to register plus 
Covariates - the across round Lone-Wolf Effect. The dependent variable is the group average of the Decision to 
Register (for each individual, 1 = on the register: actively registered under opt-in and not opted-out under opt-
out, or 0 = not on the register: not having registered under opt-in and opted-out under opt-out). We have the 
following independent variables. Round is the game number 1–22, Opt-In: 0 = Opt-out and = 1 = Opt-in. Lag 
Round Decisions = percent of group registered in the previous round. Sex: Female = 0, Male = 1. Game Beliefs: 
Not believe it is a game about organ donation = 0, Believe it is a game about organ donation = 1, Organ Donor 
Register: 0 if report not currently registered and 1 if currently registered.
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under an opt-in setting individualistic feedback results in more cooperation relative to opt-out25. The positive 
coefficient for Lag Period Decisions provides evidence of conditional cooperation within rounds. Furthermore, the 
significant interaction term Lag Period Decisions * Opt-In is negative indicating relatively less conditional cooper-
ation within rounds under opt-in compared to opt-out. That is, consistent with the hypothesized ‘lone-wolf ’ effect 
people are more likely to conditionally cooperate and deregister under opt-out than conditionally cooperate and 
register under opt-in, as there is less incentive to follow a ‘good shepherd’ compared to a ‘lone-wolf ’.
To further compare the effects of ‘lone wolves’ versus ‘good shepherds’ we chart the percentages of participants 
remaining on the register under opt-out and registering under opt-in in each period within a round (Fig. 4a,b) 
in the presence of individualistic feedback. With individualistic feedback, participants can observe and respond 
to others actions by changing or maintaining their registration status in the subsequent period. The percentage 
at each period reflects the numbers switching in their decision to register (under opt-in) or deregister (under 
opt-out). Overall (Fig. 4a), under opt-out, initially in period 1 a large number deregister (‘lone wolves’), with 
others also deregistering in subsequent periods 2 and 3. Under opt-in, there is an initial rise (‘good shepherds’) 
followed by a plateauing out. Relative to the default, these changes are more pronounced for opt-out if moving 
from opt-in to opt-out, and for opt-in if moving from opt-out to opt-in (Fig. 4b). Thus, over rounds opt-in with 







Round −0.002 (0.002) 0.226 −0.006 0.001
Opt-In 0.427 (0.056) 0.000 0.317 0.538
Lag Period Decisions 0.602 (0.060) 0.000 0.485 0.720
Lag Period Decisions * Opt-In −0.181 (0.085) 0.033 −0.347 −0.015
Age 0.021 (0.026) 0.415 −0.030 0.072
Sex 0.113 (0.112) 0.310 −0.105 0.332
Game Beliefs 0.085 (0.143) 0.551 −0.196 0.367
Organ Donor Register 0.028 (0.159) 0.860 −0.284 0.340
Constant −0.568 (0.557) 0.308 −1.659 0.523
R2 overall 0.253
N of Observations(Groups) 1,350 (35)
Table 3. Conditional Cooperation Within Rounds (Random Effects GLS Models with group level clustered 
random error) on group averages of decisions to register plus Covariates - the within round Lone-Wolf Effect. 
The dependent variable is the group average of the Decision to Register (for each individual, 1 = on the register: 
actively registered under opt-in and not opted-out under opt-out, or 0 = not on the register: not having 
registered under opt-in and opted-out under opt-out). We have the following independent variables. Round 
is the game number 1–22, Opt-In: 0 = Opt-out and = 1 = Opt-in, Lag Period Decisions = percent of group 
registered in the previous period played within the present round. Sex: Female = 0, Male = 1. Game Beliefs: 
Not believe it is a game about organ donation = 0, Believe it is a game about organ donation = 1, Organ Donor 
Register: 0 if report not currently registered and 1 if currently registered.
Figure 4. Percentage Registered as a Function of Overall Default Policy (a) and Default Policy Change (b).
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Discussion
These results extend our understanding of the dynamics of conditional cooperation and show it is influenced 
by the nature of the cooperative context (opt-out vs opt-in). When there is immediate individualistic feedback 
within a round, conditional cooperation is seen immediately. Conditional cooperation across rounds is also 
observed. However, this pattern is modified by the type of cooperative or free-riding context. When it is a cooper-
ative context (opt-out) and people choose to leave, immediate individualistic feedback enhances negative condi-
tional cooperation resulting in people following suit and leaving (the ‘lone wolf effect’). This effect of conditional 
cooperation is reversed for a free-riding context (opt-in) with people following a ‘good shepherd’ and cooper-
ating. However, this ‘good shepherd’ effect is not as strong as the ‘lone wolf ’ effect. As conditional cooperation 
is often referred to as a positive force for cooperation6,8, we propose that the influence of ‘lone wolves’ within an 
opt-out context undermines cooperation and represents a dark side of conditional cooperation. This is consistent 
with a growing literature within personality theory showing that many traits believed to be solely positive (e.g., 
conscientiousness) have a dark side43,44 and this literature is also growing in economics [see 39]. This mixture of 
positive and negative aspects of a trait or preference may help explain why their heterogeneity has an adaptive 
evolutionary basis44–46. Furthermore, the opposing negative ‘lone wolf ’ and positive ‘good shepherd’ effects result 
in comparably lower cooperation levels under opt-out, contrary to the equilibrium predictions of cooperation 
under opt-out and non-cooperation under opt-in with feedback. Thus, these results clearly identify a boundary 
condition for the power of the cooperative default – it is maximally powerful in the absence of feedback on others 
behaviour, and the conditions when lone wolves trigger off the dark side of conditional cooperation that serves 
to undermine cooperation39.
Defaults mechanism and lone wolf and good shepherd effects. Using the three characteristics that 
support the power of the default (easy in reducing the decision maker’s effort, biases the decision maker’s behav-
iour towards the status quo response, and allows for the perceived meaning of default to be inferred) and norm 
theory47 we develop our psychological understanding the ‘lone wolf ’ and ‘good shepherd’ effects and why the 
‘lone wolf ’ effect is stronger (Fig. 5). In both the opt-out and opt-in settings moving from the easy default option 
signals to others that the person moving must perceive some benefit from leaving the default. The perceived 
benefit will be determined by the meaning of the cooperative behaviour as a function of the default. In our case, 
organ donation is perceived as a mundane and everyday cooperative act under an opt-out and an extreme act of 
cooperation under opt-in21. Thus, deregistering under opt-out signals that the person is willing to exert cognitive 
and physical costs and effort to exit the easy option that everyone is part of. This may signal that the person knows 
something that others do not. Those who remain registered may experience some anxiety about remaining due to 
any uncertainty caused by the person deregistering48. Under the opt-in default the ‘good shepherd’ is leaving the 
default to move towards a cooperative act perceived as an extreme act of cooperation and thus costly. Under these 
conditions people are less likely to follow as they are less likely to perceive that the alternative is more beneficial 
than the status quo. This analysis of the meaning of the cooperative act afforded by the default supports psycho-
logically why the ‘lone wolf ’ effect is stronger than the ‘good shepherd’ effect. While we framed our experiment in 
terms of organ donation, similar arguments can be applied to the use of opt-out policies to encourage vaccination 
behaviour and environmental conservation12–14.
The observed effects may also reflect normative influences (Fig. 5). Defaults are often perceived as indicating 
what policy makers or the authorities feel that people ought to do18,49. As such, people follow the default as it 
represents an injunctive norm of what people ought to do or what is approved of. Similarly, observed conditional 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of the processes supporting ‘lone wolf ’ and ‘good shepherd’ effects.
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cooperation may be regarded as a descriptive norm of what people actually do. There is a growing body of work 
exploring the effects of both types of norm on cooperation50–59, with injunctive norms having a stronger effect 
on cooperation than descriptive norms52,59. Our findings show that in fact the dynamic expression of conditional 
cooperation (descriptive norms) operates as a function of the cooperative default (injunctive norms) setting. This 
is consistent with social radar theory (SRT) of norms which suggests that people utilize the default information in 
injunctive norms, which like a radar signal they reflect back off others’ actions (descriptive norms) to guide their 
most strategic future action they can take47. Indeed, there is good evidence that norms can be manipulated to 
influence cooperation60,61. For example, moral nudges (e.g., ‘What do you think is the morally right thing to do?’, 
or ‘What do you think society thinks is the morally right thing to do?’) have been shown to enhance cooperation 
and could be used to ameliorate the ‘lone wolf ’ effect and enhance the ‘good shepherd’ effect60. Such ‘nudges’ may 
be effect to enhance cooperation with respect to behaviours like organ donation under both opt-in and opt-out 
settings.
policy implications. Insofar as our experiment serves as a parable of conditional cooperation in organ dona-
tion, via the induced value of incentives relevant to the context, our results also have some implications regarding 
the growing debate about the effectiveness of the opt-out policies for organ donation. Critics point out that while 
an opt-out policy for organ donation increases the potential donor pool5, the policy results in: (1) a large vari-
ance in this rate (e.g., Sweden and Spain have an opt-out system, yet Sweden remains one of the lowest-ranked 
countries for organ donation in Europe, and Spain the highest)19, (2) reduced numbers of living donations19,62, 
(3) increased ethical and attitudinal concerns about ‘State’ ownership of organs63, feelings of coercion and lack of 
autonomy64 and (4) uncertainty about the exact meaning of an individuals presumed consent65. Our results serve 
as a warning about a possible negatives effect of an opt-out policy in the age of social media. That is, the overall 
positive effect of an opt-out policy on organ donation does not take into account the potential effects of feedback 
(social media posts and updates) on donor status. This is particularly pertinent now in the age of ‘social media’ 
where individualistic feedback in terms of status updates on organ donation is available24–28. Thus, the detrimental 
effect of the ‘lone wolf ’ effect is a very real possibility29, and is made worse by spill-over effects when moving to 
opt-out from opt-in as most countries do19. However, harnessing the ‘good shepherd’ effect could help encourage 
registration under opt-in as exemplified by the ‘Facebook’ effect25. Thus, we suggest that healthcare policymakers 
should consider staying with the opt-in default and investing in strategic nudges (e.g., promoting status updates 
on Facebook) to increase registration26 rather than move to an opt-out policy. If moving to an opt-out policy then 
strategies to ameliorate the ‘lone wolf ’ effect need to be considered. This could involve the use of moral norms to 
ameliorate the ‘lone wolf ’60 as well as strategies to monitor social media and ‘fake news’ or negative stories about 
organ donation should be considered.
Limitations. While we show ‘lone wolf ’ effect is stronger than the ‘good shepherd’ effect, it must be acknowl-
edged that this is in a Western university sample and needs to be replicated cross-culturally66. We mainly focused 
on the strategic choices under incentives induced by the experimental setup. Future research can investigate the 
influence of other psychological motivations such as kin altruism in familial donations. Furthermore, we exam-
ined specifically people’s active decisions to make public their decision to register under opt-in and deregister 
under opt-out. People may also make these decisions privately or just to close relatives or loved ones. Thus, we 
model a specific aspect of organ donor registration behaviour, but one that we feel will be of increasing impor-
tance in the age of social media and as more countries move to an opt-out policy for organ donation. Indeed, 
with respect to organ donation losing one or two potential donors due to a ‘lone wolf ’ effect would have major 
significance for those waiting for an organ. Indeed, it has been argued that an effect size should be considered in 
relative, not absolute, terms67 and as such there is likely a real clinical impact of the ‘lone wolf ’.
Data availality
The data files for the economic game reported here will be made available on the OSF page (https://osf.io/2eu3d/) 
as well as waves 1 and 2 of the online experiment.
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